Over a year ago, I published a series of essays in response to the Anglican Diocese of the Living Word’s “Response” to an earlier essay entitled “Women in Holy Orders” that Bishop and New Testament Professor Grant LeMarquand and I had written in response to a request of the bishops of the ACNA in 2018. Since then, my book Icons of Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Theology for Women’s Ordination was published by Baylor University Press. My previous essays in response to the Anglican Diocese of the Living Word’s “Response” primarily focused on questions of hermeneutics, or provided correction to criticisms that were misreadings of what we had actually written.

However, The Anglican Diocese of the Living Word “Response” is entirely an example of “complementarianism,” the Evangelical Protestant position against women’s ordination that claims that while men and women have equal ontological worth, women are necessarily subordinate to the authority of men. In consequence, men and women play different “roles”; it is the “role” of men to exercise authority and leadership, and the “role” of women is to obey men who exercise these leadership “roles.” The primary area of leadership of men over women is in the family, where husbands exercise authority over wives, but because the pastoral office is one of leadership, women cannot be ordained because this would involve women clergy exercising leadership over men parshioners.

In order to buttress this claim, much of the argument in the Anglican Diocese of the Living Word’s “Response” echoes complementarian exegesis of a handful of key biblical passages. Moving on from preliminary hermeneutical issues, I now turn to these exegetical concerns. This essay will focus on the creation narratives of Genesis 1-3.

Relational Inequality?

In any theological disagreement, it is important to be clear from the beginning concerning the basic issue of disagreement. What is actually being claimed, and on what basis?

Complementarians and egalitarians both agree that a subordination of women to men can be found in Scripture. They disagree about the reason for this subordination, and whether it is something to be maintained or rather should be overcome. Complementarians claim that the subordination of women to men is founded in God’s creation of humanity as male and female, and is intended by God to be a permanent creation order. The fall into sin has contributed to distortions of the hierarchy, as women sometimes rebel against this subordination, and men sometimes rule harshly over women, but the hierarchy itself is permanent because divinely intended. Egalitarians claim to the contrary that God’s intention in creation was that men and women be equal partners, without subordination. To the extent that subordination of women exists, it is a consequence of the fall into sin, is not God’s intention, and, like other aspects of the fall, is to be overcome as much as possible.

Genesis 1 to 3 is crucial for this discussion because these are the single Old Testament texts that lay the groundwork for any discussion of male and female sexuality, and it is to these chapters that New Testament authors turn repeatedly in their own discussions of sexuality (Mark 10:6-9; Matt. 19:4-6; 1 Cor. 11:8; Eph. 5:31-33). Moreover, it is these chapters that discuss the original creation of humanity as male and female, and contain the first reference to female to male subordination. The woman is told: “your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you” (Genesis 3:16).

The initial burden of proof in this discussion should be equal between complementarians and egalitarians. If egalitarians claim that God’s original intention for the creation of humanity as male and female was that they be equal partners, and that subordination is a consequence of sin, then they should be able to establish this from a careful reading of the text. To the contrary, if complementarians claim that female subordination to males is something that God intended as part of the original creation and that this subordination is not a consequence of sin, then they have an equal obligation to make their case from a plain sense reading of the text. It will not do for complementarians simply to assume that subordination of women to men is God’s intention and then to accuse egalitarians who do not find this in Genesis 1 to 3 of reading egalitarian assumptions into the text. That would be to beg the question.

It should also be clear that the burden of proof demands less of egalitarians than complementarians. Egalitarians need to establish only that in the description of the original creation of humanity as male and female in Genesis, both are described and treated in an equal manner with equal responsibilities, without mention of any distinction of hierarchy. They would also need to establish that when Scripture speaks of the subordination of women to men, it does so in the context of the fall into sin, and as a consequence of sin. They do not need to establish such things as that equality always excludes hierarchy or that there are no examples of hierarchy elsewhere in Scripture. The existence of hierarchy is not the issue, but rather, whether Genesis 1 to 3 teaches that there is a permanent hierarchy between men and women and that this is founded in creation, and not as a consequence of the fall into sin.

To the contrary, complementarians need to demonstrate not only that Genesis 1 to 3 speaks of a hierarchy of men over women, but that this is a permanent hierarchy intended by God, founded in creation, and is not a consequence of the fall into sin. Claiming that there are examples of hierarchy elsewhere in Scripture, or that hierarchy can be compatible with equality, or that the creation equality described in Genesis 1 to 3 could nonetheless include hierarchy, are red herring arguments. They do not establish the point at issue. If the complementarian position is first established by a plain reading of Scripture, then these points might follow as logical implications, but implications that would follow if an argument were correct cannot themselves be used as premises to establish the argument. To do so is to beg the question.

“Women in Holy Orders” is a very short document, necessarily so because the Bishops who requested it asked that we make it as short as possible. The document includes seven short paragraphs discussing the creation and the fall, focusing on Genesis 1-3. In Icons of Christ, I devote a chapter of 22 pages to this material. Even this could have been much longer, but in my book, my purpose was not to provide an exhaustive discussion, but to summarize the work of others, and to point readers to their works should they wish to pursue the discussion further. In the same way, the footnotes of our short essay as well as its bibliography pointed readers to further references. It seems clear from their response that the writers of the “Response” had not read this material, and were not familiar with it. (More on this later.)

Even given the shortness of our seven paragraphs on creation and the fall, it should be clear that we were addressing two questions only: (1) Is there evidence in the creation narratives of Genesis for a sexual hierarchy of men over women? (2) If there is such a hierarchy, is it part of the creation order, or is it a result of the fall? That is, we were attempting to address the two questions over which egalitarians and complementarians disagree by asking “What do the biblical texts actually say?”

Our conclusion is that (1) there is no evidence for such a hierarchy in the discussion of creation in Genesis 1 and 2; rather, men and women are presented as equal in every way, with equal responsibilities for stewardship over creation. Within the text itself, “There is no hint of hierarchy or subordination of any kind, or any suggestions that the man is to command or be in charge of the woman or she to obey him.” (2) To the extent that any hierarchy is mentioned, it is associated with the fall into sin in Genesis 3: “Part of the curse involves an unbalanced hierarchy. The woman is told: ‘your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you.’ (Genesis 3:16) The hierarchy of genders which is so ingrained in most cultures of the world is not a part of the created order, but a part of the fallen state.”

The writers of the “Response” complain: “[T]he authors do not establish from the biblical text that the responsibilities within that shared task are or must be distributed in an egalitarian manner.” This begs the question and shifts the burden of proof on the issue that needs to be established: (1) Is there evidence in the creation narratives of Genesis for a sexual hierarchy of men over women? Given that Genesis 1:28 states that God gave the creation mandate equally to men and women – “Let them have dominion” – there is no evidence for sexual hierarchy, and a plain sense reading points to the dominion being equally shared. If it is not distributed, and not equally shared, then that needs to be established from the text itself, and it cannot be established by demanding that one’s opponents instead establish to the contrary.

The writers of the “Response” distract from the real issue by addressing another question instead. They claim: “The unstated assumption underlying their argument at this point is that ontological equality somehow precludes relational hierarchy.” They then point to three examples of hierarchy in Scripture. The first two are matters of governmental office: (1) the apostle Paul’s command to submit to governmental authorities (Rom. 13); (2) Jonathan’s submission to David as future ruler of Israel. (3) The submission of children to parents points to a hierarchy in family structure.

The acknowledgment by the writers of the “Response” that this assumption that equality always excludes hierarchy is an “unstated assumption” [my emphasis] should have been a warning not to put words into other people’s mouths. To the contrary, nowhere in our essay do we suggest that ontological equality always precludes relational hierarchy. Our argument is an argument for the ordination of women, and in so far as ordination is an office, it presumes a certain kind of authority, which an ordained woman would exercise.

The issue of office and authority is a separate issue and one that would have to be addressed at length. Different persons can exercise office in different spheres, and one who has authority in one sphere might not have authority in another. As a teacher, I have authority in the classroom over a student who might be a police officer, who would alternatively have legal authority over me as a citizen in a situation where I might be driving my automobile outside the classroom. But such authority is not based on gender. If the student in my class were a woman police officer, she would still have authority to give me a ticket if she pulled me over for speeding.

Also, hierarchical authority is based on competence in the area in which one exercises authority, it can only be exercised if the authority over another is justified, and it is not inherently permanent, but can be exercised by different persons on different occasions. The examples pointed to in the “Response” actually make this point. Jonathan was the son of Saul the king of Israel, who exercised governmental authority over David. Jonathan would have been king, but because he died, he was succeeded by David instead. Children are indeed in submission to their parents because children lack competence, but such submission ends when the children become adults.

As for gender hierarchy, husbands are not representatives of legal authority who exercise judicial authority over their wives. Indeed, a husband could conceivably fall under his wife’s legal authority if she were a judge, and he were accused of a crime. (Conflict of interest would likely prevent such authority from being exercised.) Children indeed fall under their parents’ authority because children are incapable of making mature adult decisions. (This is at least one of the reasons that society has separate juvenile courts, and it is only rarely that a child accused for a crime is tried “as an adult.”) But children reach adulthood and at some point are no longer under their parents’ authority. To the contrary, the subordination of women to men demanded by complementarians is based neither on competence nor office, is permanent, and is grounded in nothing other than the difference between male and female sex. Because of this, competence, justice, and possible interchanges of authority, simply do not enter into the equation. Accordingly, these crucial differences mean that the “Response’s” comparisons to these other hierarchies actually count against their argument.

The single question that needs to be addressed in the discussion of the creation narratives of Genesis 1 to 3 is not whether equality excludes hierarchy, but rather whether men as men have a permanent and exclusive hierarchy over women as women simply because they are men, and simply because women are women, and whether this is founded in creation. Pointing out that hierarchical authority exists in other spheres besides the relation between men and women has no bearing on that question whatsoever. Claiming that the creation mandate in Genesis 1:28 is not distributed equally between men and women needs to be established from the text itself, not simply assumed without argument.

Gentlemen First . . .

Given that Genesis 1 and 2 speak only of an equality of men and women, and that there is no evidence in the text whatsoever for a subordination of women to men prior to the fall, complementarian advocates necessarily have to make an argument based on “inference,” and the authors of the “Response” follow this path, citing traditional complementarian author Thomas R. Schreiner’s use of the word “hints.” The “hints” echoed by the authors are standard complementarian tropes, now repeated so often as to become cliches. The “Response” cites the usual complementarian authorities, not only Schreiner, but Wayne Grudem and Douglas Moo. Egalitarians have long pointed out the inadequacies of these arguments, and at least one of the reasons that our essay provided both footnotes and a bibliography was to point readers in the direction of some of this material. I myself had already addressed the standard complementarian objections in an essay on my blog, which later appeared in my book on pages 60 to 64. As noted above, the “Response” provides no evidence of having read or being familiar with egalitarian scholarship addressing these complementarian “hints.”

The first “hint” appealed to by the “Response” is one of the oldest. “God created Adam first.”

Our essay addressed this to the extent that we pointed out:

It is also misleading to speak of the woman being created “second.” English translations create an ambiguity that does not appear in the original Hebrew. Unlike modern English, Hebrew makes a distinction between the word ha’adam (properly translated “the human being” or “humanity”) and the word translated “male human being.” Gen. 1:28 describes the creation of humanity or humankind (ha’adam) in the image of God as male and female. Gen. 2:4 describes (with a deliberate pun) the creation of a single human being (ha’adam), whom God creates by taking him from the earth (ha’adamah), an earth which he will later cultivate. The name “Adam” does not appear until Genesis 4:25 (or possibly 4:1), and is simply the Hebrew generic name for “human being” (without the article).

Many English translations translate all of these instances of ha’adam as “man,” but this is misleading if “man” is understood to mean “male human being.” The Hebrew word for “male human being” does not appear until Gen. 2:23, when sexuality first enters the picture as the Hebrew word for “man” (male human being) is introduced rather than the generic ha’adam as both man and woman are identified as such for the first time: “This at last is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh; she call be called Woman (‘issa) because she was taken out of Man (‘is).” The woman is called “Woman” (‘issa) because she is taken from the “Man” (‘is), just as he was taken from the earth. The terms ‘is and ‘issa emphasize the likeness of the man and the woman, the only difference being the corresponding feminine ending for the word ‘issa. This does not mean that the first human being in Genesis was an androgyne, but rather that sexuality does not exist except when men and women live in communion with one another. Men exist as men and women as women only as companions of one another. Neither can be complete without the other.

This is a standard observation made in numerous commentaries. The authors seem not to be familiar with the discussion insofar as they incorrectly identify the Hebrew word for “human” as ha’adama rather than ha’adam. As is clear from the quote above, ha’adam is “human”; ha’adama is the earth from which the human is taken. The authors do not actually address the Hebrew text itself, but rather turn to Greek citations, first from the apostle Paul and then from the LXX (Greek) translation of the Old Testament, to claim that whatever the Hebrew says, it cannot possibly mean what we say it means.

The “Response” turns first to the apostle Paul, who writes:

Not is man (anēr) from (ek) woman (gunaikos), but woman (gunē) from (ek) man (andros). Nor was man (anēr) created for the sake/because of/through (dia) the woman (gunaika), but woman (gunē) for the sake of/because of/through (dia) the man (andros).

Because of (dia) this, the woman (gunē) should have authority over her head, because of (dia) the angels.

Nonetheless, neither woman (gunē) without man (andros), nor man (anēr) without woman (gunaikos) in the Lord. For just as the woman (gunē) from (ek) the man (andros), so also the man (anēr) through (dia) the woman (gunaikos), and all [people] from (ek) God. (1 Cor. 11:8-12, my own literal translation)

The authors claim that Paul uses andros and anēr (male human being) throughout the passage rather than anthrōpos (generic human being), and that this somehow defeats our claim that “men exist as men and women as women only as companions to one another” because (they point out) Paul claims that the male was created first. This rather has Paul’s argument backward. It is evident that Paul is appealing directly to Genesis 2:23, in which the human being (ha’adam) says: “This at last is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh; she called be called woman (‘issa) because she was taken out of man (‘is).” Paul uses the Greek terms for male (andros, anēr) and female (gunē) throughout the passage because they echo the Hebrew distinction in Genesis 2:23 between man (‘is) and woman (‘issa), which, as we noted, occurs here for the first time in the Hebrew text of Genesis 2.

Moreover, Paul’s point throughout is precisely the one that we had made, that “men exist as men and women as women only as companions of one another.” Just as Paul appealed to the Genesis 2:23 passage to claim that woman (‘issa, gunē) is from (ek) man (‘is, andros) because she was taken from the first man’s side, so he now balances this by pointing out that all men are from women in that men are born literally through (dia) women. If Paul had used anthrōpos instead of anēr, andros in this argument, it would have undermined his reference to the crucial Genesis 2:23 passage.

It is in Genesis 2:23 that the man and woman are first recognized in their mutual interdependence as man and woman because the woman comes from the man, and Paul’s argument is precisely the same. Men and women receive their identity and interdependence from one another insofar as the first woman came from the first man; however, Paul goes beyond this to make clear that temporal priority is not the crucial issue, but rather interdependence, insofar as he points out that all men now come from (are born through) women.

In addition, Paul does use anthrōpos (and not anēr) in his famous analogy in Romans 5 where he argues that Christ is the second Adam. Just as sin came into the world through the one human being (anthrōpos) Adam, so God’s grace has come through the one human being (anthrōpos) Jesus Christ. So Paul’s arguments make almost the opposite point from the one that the “Response” claims. Paul echoes Genesis 2:23 to make the point that men and women are mutually dependent on one another and belong to one another. Paul uses a typological analogy between Adam and Christ not to argue that Adam and Christ are representative of humanity because they are male, but rather that Adam and Christ play their respective typological roles precisely as human (anthrōpos), not as male.

The authors next make a reference to the LXX translation of Genesis 2, claiming that the Greek translators use anthrōpos throughout Genesis 2, both before the creation and after. “If the Jewish translators believed that Adam did not become a genuine male until after the woman was created, they could have used anthrōpos from Genesis 2:7 to 2:22 and switched to anēr or andros. That they use anthrōpos throughout indicates that they do not use anthrōpos in its generic sense and that they understood Adam to be male both before and after the woman appeared on the scene.”

The writers have clearly misread our argument if they interpret us to mean that Adam did not “become a genuine male until after the woman was created.” The argument is rather that the generic use of ha’adam means that the Hebrew text does not recognize the human being as male until the first woman is created, and that this recognition implies that men and women are mutually interdependent. Second, key theological arguments should depend on how terms are used in the original languages rather than translations. The LXX is not the Hebrew text.

But the claim here is also misleading. The LXX uses anthrōpos in the generic sense in both Genesis 1:26 and 1:27. So even in the Greek translation of the LXX as in the Hebrew original, a genuine change takes place in 2:23, in which the woman is identified as gunē and the man as andros. It is also not the case that the LXX uses anthrōpos “throughout” Genesis 2. The LXX does have anthrōpos in Gen. 2:15, but in verses 16, 19-23 translates ha’adam not as anthrōpos, but simply transliterates it as Adam.

The Hebrew identifies the man (‘is) and the woman (‘issa) in 2:23 and 2:24, but the next verse closes with “And the human being (ha’adam) and his wife were both naked and were not ashamed” (Gen. 2:25). Moreover, although the Hebrew identifies the male human being as ‘is in both verses 23 and 25, it identifies him as ha’adam throughout chapter 3. The LXX translates ‘is as anthrōpos in the single instance of 2:24, but then transliterates ha’adam as Adam in verse 25. So the claim that the LXX translators “use anthrōpos throughout” is highly misleading. The Hebrew itself only uses ‘is twice in the chapter, and in verse 25 returns to ha’adam. The LXX does translate ‘is in the crucial verse 23 as andros, but translated the other single instance as anthrōpos in verse 24. A single instance does not constitute “throughout.” Moreover, that the LXX so often transliterates ha’adam (with the article) as “Adam” rather than anthrōpos makes clear that the LXX translators do not seem to have been too concerned about exactness or consistency in translation. The “Response” claim here is tendentious. (For the Greek, see https://www.septuagint.bible/-/genesis-2).

In addition, as numerous egalitarian writers have pointed out, priority of order does not in itself imply authority or hierarchy. In Genesis 1, the animals are created prior to humanity, and in Genesis 2, they precede the creation of the woman. If priority of creation order implied authority or hierarchy, then fish and birds created on the fifth day would have authority over land animals, and all animals would have authority over human beings. To the contrary, God gives both man and woman authority over animals (Gen. 1:26-29).¹

Moreover, even if we grant the “Response’s” claim that the “human being” of Genesis 2 is a male human being, comparison with other ancient Middle Eastern cultures makes clear that creation order has no significance for hierarchy. Richard Hess has pointed out that the Mediterranean creation story of Atrahasis, which comes from the same time and culture as the laws of Hammurabi, includes parallels to the Genesis stories of a primeval paradise, a subsequent rebellion, and a flood. However, unlike the Genesis account, the woman is created first. Whenever men and women are mentioned, the woman is mentioned first. Nonetheless, ancient Mesopotamia was highly patriarchal, more so than ancient Israel.²

More “Hints”

The “Response” devotes most of its space to defending the creation order of man before woman in their discussion of Genesis 2, but they echo other “hints” as well. Again, none of these “hints” reflect recent scholarly discussion, and all have been addressed numerous times in the literature.

“Adam names the animals.”

Although the authors acknowledge that in Genesis 1:28 God gives the creation mandate to both man and woman, they claim that because the man “named all of the animals,” these “responsibilities conferred on Adam,” indicate “a subordinate role for Eve.”

A fundamental mistake in complementarian readings of the creation narratives of Genesis 1 to 3 is to miss the significance of the narrative flow of the texts. Both Hess and Philip Payne point out that the reason for sequenced order in Genesis 2 has to do with the narrative flow of the text. The purpose of the naming of the animals is made clear from the two verses that bracket the passage: “It is not good for the human being to be alone. . . . But for the human being no partner corresponding to him was found” (Gen. 2: 18, 20). The text is explicit that the purpose of the naming the animals is to demonstrate the mutual need of man and woman for each other in that the originally created human being had failed to find a suitable companion in the animals. Nothing in the text itself suggests that the naming of the animals has anything to do with exercising authority over them. In the creation of the woman, the man does not exercise “responsibility,” but is entirely passive. God puts him in a deep sleep, and creates the woman from his side. His exclamation “This is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh!” (2:23) makes clear that he has finally found a suitable companion. “Bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh” points to kinship, not subordination.³

“The woman was created for man as his helper.”

The authors of the “Response” acknowledged that our original essay had pointed out that the Hebrew word ‘ezer “does not necessarily imply an inferior social role,” and that God “refers to himself as Israel’s helper.” They do not actually respond to this point, but rather claim incorrectly that we assume that “ontological equality and joint authority must necessarily mean egalitarian roles.” What we had written was that “context determines meaning.” The narrative context in which Genesis speaks of the woman as a “helper” for the man is that she comes to his rescue by relieving his loneliness. She is the one who is taking the active role here, not he. Nothing in the narrative context of Genesis 2 implies that “helper” means subordination. The use of the word in other contexts indicates that ‘ezer means power or strength. Again, God is designated as ‘ezer.⁴ If ‘ezer implies subordination, the burden of proof would be on complementarians to demonstrate this from the text itself, not simply to assert it.

“After the fall, God calls to the man first for an explanation.”

Again, this is an example of missing the significance of the narrative structure of the text. God addresses the man first because he was the first one that God had told not to eat the fruit of the tree, and he was the last one who ate. Also the text introduces a common Hebrew literary chiasm. The snake, the woman, and the man are introduced in that order in Genesis 3. They are referred to in reverse order in what follows: the man is addressed, who blames the woman; the woman is addressed, who blames the snake. There is a return to the original order: judgment is pronounced on the snake, then on the woman, finally on the man. The narrative structure of the text thus follows: (ABC) snake, woman, man; (CBA) man, woman, snake; (ABC) snake, woman, man.⁵

“[Paul] makes Adam and his sin the counterpart to Christ and his obedience.”

The authors claim that God gave Adam the command not to eat of the fruit before he made the woman, and it was therefore his responsibility to teach her to obey the command. This implies that men have the responsibility to care and protect their families.

While no egalitarian would deny that men have responsibilities to care for and protect their families – although women do as well – it is rather a leap of logic to conclude that because God gave Adam the command not to eat the fruit before the woman, and that Paul draws a typological parallel between Adam and Christ, that a “relational hierarchy [is] established in creation.”

What the writers miss here is literary context, specifically how Paul uses typology in his writings. Paul can use female types to prove a point (Gal. 4). However, in making a typological comparison pointing to Jesus Christ, Paul would have used the male figure of Adam to pre-figure Jesus, since Jesus is a male. There is also a parallel between Adam (whose name “Adam” means “human being”) as the first human being through whom sin originated, and Jesus Christ as the new creation of God (the second Adam or human being) through whom sin is destroyed. As noted above, in Romans 5, Paul uses the Greek word anthrōpos, properly translated “human being,” rather than anēr, properly translated “male human being” to describe both Adam and Christ. So, “sin entered the world through one human being (di henos anthrōpou) . . . and death spread to all human beings (eis pantas anthrōpous)” (verse 12); “For if the many died by the trespass of the one, how much more did God’s grace and the gift that came by the grace of the one human being Jesus Christ (tou henos anthrōpou Iēsou Christou), overflow to the many!” (verse 15); “For just as through the disobedience of the one human being (ou henos anthrōpou) the many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of the one, the many will be made righteous” (verse 19).

The “Response” lists other “hints” as well, for example, the parallel between God as husband of Israel and Christ as the bridegroom of the female church. I address this parallel at length in my book, but (should I find time), will turn to to it when I discuss the relevant New Testament passages.

In conclusion, the “Response”’s attempt to establish a “hierarchical” relationship between men and women based on the creation narratives of Genesis 1 to 3 is inadequate.

First, the writers misrepresent and address the wrong issue. The question is not whether legitimate hierarchies exist and whether such hierarchies might be compatible with ontological equality. The issue of disagreement is whether there is a permanent hierarchy between men (as men) and women (as women) intended by God, grounded in creation, not a consequence of sin, and based not on any ontological inequality, competence, or designated office, but simply on sexual differentiation. The claim is that men have authority and priority over women simply because they are men; women are subordinate to male authority simply because they are women. This is what needs to be established.

Second, the writers exhibit the logical fallacy of demanding the proof of a negative. They demand that we prove that male authority is not in the texts. That is, the writers of the “Response” presume that egalitarians have a responsibility to prove that the equality of men and women which complementarians also acknowledge exists in Genesis 1 to 3 necessarily excludes female to male subordination. Rather, if that equality is present, complementarians have the burden to show that, despite this equality, Genesis 1 to 3 also affirms a subordination of women to men grounded in creation, and not as a consequence of the fall into sin. The “Response”’s tactic here is analogous to the fallacy of claiming that those who deny the existence of “Big Foot” or “space aliens” or the “Loch Ness Monster” have to prove that such do not exist. Rather, if there is a subordination of women to men taught in Genesis 1 to 3, it is not the responsibility of egalitarians to prove that such subordination does not exist, but of complementiarians to demonstrate that it does.

Third, a plain sense reading of Genesis 1 to 3 aligns with the egalitarian rather than complementarian claims. The creation accounts of creation in Genesis 1 and 2 speak only of an equality between men and women, and do not mention subordination until Genesis 3:16, as one of the consequences of sin. Because no subordination is mentioned before the fall, complementarians necessarily have to make their case on the basis of “hints,” and the hints to which the “Responders” appeal are standard complementarian “chestnuts”: the priority of the creation of Adam, Adam’s naming of the animals, Eve being created as a “helper” for Adam, Adam bearing responsibility for sin, Christ as the “new Adam” rather than the “new Eve.” The writers of the “Response” seem unaware of the many responses to these “hints” that have been available for decades now.

The chief error of the “Response” in this regard is that of treating their various “hints” in isolation from the actual narrative structure of the biblical texts. For example, within the narrative structure of Genesis 2, they miss the significance of the literary structure of the creation of, first, the “human being,” then the animals, then of the woman, with the recognition that unlike the case with the animals, the man (‘is for the first time) recognizes the woman (‘issa) as “flesh of my flesh” and “bone of my bone.” Within the chiastic literary structure of Genesis 3, they miss the significance of the order of (1a) snake, (1b) woman, (1c) man → (2c) man, (2b) woman, (2a) snake → (3a) snake, (3b) woman, (3c) man. In the New Testament, how does Paul’s typology function? In 1 Corinthians 11, Paul draws on Genesis 2:23 not to use creation order as an argument for male priority, but just the opposite – to emphasize male and female interdependence; just as the first woman came from (the side of) the first man, so all men now come from women (through childbirth). If what is significant about either Adam or Christ is that they are male, then in writing of a typology between Adam and Christ, Paul certainly would have referred to Adam and Christ with the Greek terms for male human being (anēr, andros). But he didn’t. Instead, Paul referred to both Adam and Christ using the generic Greek word for human being (anthrōpos). As the second Adam, Jesus Christ is not the “new male,” the exemplar of males, but the exemplar of humanity, of all human beings, both male and female.