An indication that a particular interpretation of Scripture is being driven by an a priori hermeneutic can often be detected by frequency of vocabulary that appears outside of explicit exegetical discussion. There are three crucial words that appear frequently in the vocabulary of complementarian writers (those opposed to women’s ordination on the grounds of a permanent hierarchy of men over women): “authority,” “headship,” “roles.”

It’s All About Being in Charge

The authors of the Anglican Diocese of the Living Word’s Response to the essay Women in Holy Orders, written by Bishop Grant LeMarquand and myself, embrace a complementarian hermeneutic. Accordingly, these three words – “authority,” “headship,” “roles” – make frequent appearances in the Response. The notion of “authority” is perhaps the most important theme in the Responders’essay – so important that by my count, the authors use the word sixty times in a document of 79 pages, excluding those times in which they are quoting other authors – almost once per page!

A key notion in the complementarian position against women’s ordination is that of “headship.” In modern English, the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, and in Latin, “head” used as a metaphor commonly means to “exercise authority over,” that is, to be a “boss,” someone “in charge.” Complementarians understand the apostle Paul’s use of the metaphor of “head” to mean that in the same way that Christ (as head) has authority over the church, so husbands (as head) have authority over their wives, and men (in general) (as “head”) have authority over women (in general). This metaphor of “head” is so central to the complementarian position that opponents of women’s ordination use the word “headship” to describe their position even in discussing passages where the word kephalē does not appear in the biblical text.

The Greek word for “head” (κεφαλή, kephalē ) that is so central to the complementarian position appears as a metaphor for the relationship between men and women in only two NT passages: Ephesians 5:23 (where the word appears twice), and 1 Cor. 11:2-12, where the word is used nine times to refer to one’s literal head, but metaphorically only three times (in verse 3). While the metaphor of “head” commonly means “authority” in modern English, numerous scholars have argued that the metaphor did not function that way either in ancient Greek or in Paul’s own use in Ephesians and 1 Corinthians (to be discussed below). Significantly, the authors of the Response use the word “headship” eight times, all in sections of the document not discussing the meaning of kephalē in Ephesians 5:23 or 1 Cor. 11:3. (Is it necessary to point out that there is no word that could be translated “headship” in the Bible?)

The Greek word for “authority” (ἐξουσία, exousia) appears nowhere in the crucial discussion in Ephesians 5, and only once in 1 Cor. 11:10, where the Greek states that “a woman ought to have authority over her head.” Context and Greek grammar indicate that the authority referred to in v. 10 is the woman’s own authority, not that of a male “head” over her (again, to be discussed in a later essay). The authors of the Response insist to the contrary that the single word “authority” in 1 Cor. 11:10 must refer to the authority of a woman’s husband over her.

Finally, a crucial notion in the complementarian position against women’s ordination is that of gender “roles.” The claim is that while men and women are ontologically equal, there is nonetheless a distinction of “roles.” It is the “role” of men to be in positions of leadership and authority, and the “role” of women to be subordinate to male authority, especially in the home and the church.

Any Greek word translated “role” does not appear in either Ephesians 5 or 1 Corinthians 11. Despite the lack of any biblical terminology that could be translated as “role,” by my count (excluding those times when they are citing other writers), the authors of the Response use the word “role” in reference to positions of hierarchy 48 times. (The notion of distinct gender “roles” based on authority seems to be an invention of complementarian authors. I am not aware of any use of the terminology before George W. Knight, III’s, The Role Relationship of Men and Women: New Testament Teaching (Philipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1977, 1985).)

Given the disparity in usage of the vocabulary of “head,” “authority,” and “roles” between The Response and the two critical biblical passages of Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11, it is reasonable to ask whether exegesis is guiding interpretation or rather the reverse.

In what immediately follows, I will respond to the authors of the Response, who, in their criticisms of Women in Holy Orders, claim that Paul’s use of kephale certainly does mean “authority over” and that Grant LeMarquand and myself were simply mistaken to claim otherwise in our essay Women in Holy Orders. In addition, I will also address a single criticism concerning Paul’s source for the kephalē metaphor raised by the writer Matthew Colvin in a Review Essay of my book Icons of Christ. I will use this essay to go beyond what I had written in my book.

The writers of the Response make three fundamental errors in their discussion, each of which will be examined in turn. First, they assume that the meaning of Paul’s metaphorical use of kephalē is to be discerned from examples found outside of Paul’s own writings, either in the LXX translation of the Old Testament or in pagan literature outside the Bible. To the contrary, as we pointed out in Women in Holy Orders, and, as I argue in my book, Paul’s usage of the metaphor is unique. He is the first person in antiquity to use the metaphor “head” to describe the relationship between husbands and wives or men and women. Paul is thus using what scholars call a “live metaphor,” and the only way to interpret the metaphor is to examine how Paul himself used the metaphor, not how it was used by someone else elsewhere.

Second, the writers of the Response are selective in their use of scholarly resources. I had mentioned in previous essays that the Response authors do not seem familiar with literature in this discussion apart from the complementarian perspective. They regularly appeal to standard complementarian authors such as Wayne Grudem and Thomas Schreiner, but do not acknowledge that the complementarian claims have been repeatedly challenged and refuted in the literature. In our original essay, we cited New Testament scholars such as Ben Witherington, III, Michael J. Gorman, Philip B. Payne, Gordon Fee, Kenneth Bailey, Anthony Thiselton, and Craig S. Keener, but the writers of the Response do not interact with or show familiarity with any of these authors. Interestingly enough, they do cite two egalitarians authors in the footnotes of their discussion of kephalē: Richard S. Cervin and Alan Johnson. In both cases, however, their citations are selective and misleading. Both Cervin and Johnson actually reject the complementarian interpretation of Paul’s use of the metaphor kephalē, and so count against the Responders’ position. The Responders also cite two egalitarian authors – Richard Bauckham and Anthony Thiselton – with the implication that these writers agree with their position. To the contrary, Bauckham and Thiselton reject the complementarian position and affirm the egalitarian position!

Third, I intend to show that the authors of the Response utilize an a priori rationalist and deductive hermeneutic which predetermines the outcomes of their exegesis rather than an inductive a posteriori approach to exegesis that carefully follows the narrative logic of the texts. They draw deductive conclusions about Paul’s use of the metaphor “head” as applied to Christ to lead to implications about what the metaphor must mean as applied to the relationship between men and women, rather than following Paul’s actual use of the “head” metaphor in the context of Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11. They impose a meaning on Paul’s use of the word “authority” in 1 Cor. 11:10 that is contrary to the actual grammar of the text, thus introducing the notion of authority into texts for which there is no explicit warrant in the texts themselves. Finally, this rationalist deductivism leads them to misread the narrative logic of 1 Corinthians 11.

This essay will address the first two errors: dependence on sources from outside the New Testament; selective (and misleading) use of scholarly resources. A later essay will address questions of rationalistic exegesis and hermeneutics.

The meaning of the “head” metaphor in Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11

What follows will address whether “head” (kephalē) used as a metaphor in Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 means “authority over.” The discussion in Women in Holy Orders was deliberately concise, but I address these issues at greater length in two separate chapters of my book Icons of Christ. I argue in my book that “‘head’ in 1 Corinthians 11 and Ephesians 5 almost certainly does not mean “authority over.”¹

Although longer than the material in Women in Holy Orders, my discussion in Icons of Christ was necessarily a summary of what others (who are certainly more expert than I) had written, and I could not go into detail or address every possible or unforeseen objection. (In the much shorter Women in Holy Orders, we were quite clear that limitations of space forbade our addressing every possible issue or objection.) In this essay, I will rely primarily on two authors – Richard Cervin and Philip Payne – who have addressed the question of the meaning of the metaphor kephalē in some detail. Cervin’s work appears in two essays: “Does Кεφαλή Mean ‘Source’ or ‘Authority Over’ in Greek Literature? A Rebuttal,” Trinity Journal 10 NS (1989): 85-112 and “On the Significance of Kephalē (‘Head’): A Study of the Abuse of One Greek Word,” CBE International April 30, 2016: 8-20. Payne’s discussion appears in his book Man and Woman, One in Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Paul’s Letters (Zondervan, 2009), “What about Headship? From Hierarchy to Equality,” a chapter in Mutual by Design, as well as “Evidence for κεφαλή Meaning ‘Source’ in Greek Literature and the Traditional Pauline Corpus,” a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, November 16, 2016, a copy of which Payne was kind enough to email to me.

Appeal to Examples Outside Paul

In the essay Women in Holy Orders, we had pointed out that biblical scholars had challenged the notion that kephalē used as a metaphor in Paul meant “authority,” among other reasons, because when the Greek LXX translators of the Old Testament translated the Hebrew word “head” (rosh) used literally to refer to the physical head, they regularly translated with kephalē. However, when translating the Hebrew word for “head” as a metaphor for “leader,” the LXX translators regularly used words like archōn (ἄρχων) instead, implying that native Greek speakers did not normally understand the metaphor “head” to mean “leader” or authority. We noted that out of the approximately 180 times when the Hebrew Bible uses the word rosh as a metaphor for “leader” or “chieftain,” the LXX translates it as kephalē only six times.

This is very important, and cannot simply be ignored. For comparison, Philip Payne points out that the NASB (a very literal modern English translation) translates the metaphorical use of “head” to mean “leader” as English “head” 115 out of 171 instances, which makes sense because in modern English, “head” is a common metaphor for “leader.”² Anyone who claims that kephalē would have been understood by native Greek speakers to be a normal metaphor for “leader” or “authority” has to offer some explanation for this discrepancy in the LXX translation (six times against 171 possible Hebrew instances). The LXX translators could have translated metaphorical “head” as kephalē, but, in the majority of cases, they chose the literal archōn instead. Why? Gordon Fee writes: “The clearest evidence for the real differences between the Jewish and metaphorical uses is to be found in the Septuagint (LXX).” That the translators eliminated the metaphor and substituted the literal archōn “is evidence that they were uncomfortable with (unfamiliar with?) the Jewish metaphor and simply translated it out.”³

In Richard Cervin’s original response to Wayne Grudem, he wrote: “There are several problems with the LXX passages which Grudem turns a blind eye to. The biggest problem is the fact that [kephalē] is seldom used as a translation of the Hebrew [rosh] when the Hebrew word refers explicitly to leaders. . . . If the ‘head = leader’ metaphor is as common in Greek as it is in Hebrew, why did the translators of the LXX not use it? Grudem has failed to address this issue . . .”⁴ In a more recent essay, Cervin writes: “[I]f we assume that kephalē were a common and prevalent Greek metaphor for leader, then that same well-established Hebrew metaphor (ro’sh = ‘leader’) should be perfectly transferable into Greek and we should expect a nearly 100% translation rate: ro’sh = kephalē (leader). However, this has simply not occurred. . . . Those who argue for ‘authority’ have not adequately explained this problem.”⁵

I have so far found no examples of defenders of complementarianism who even acknowledge the significance of this disparity in the LXX translators, and the writers of the Response are no exception.⁶ They had to have been aware of the problem because they quote our paragraph pointing it out, and their footnotes refer to the second essay by Cervin. Nonetheless, they simply ignore this significant problem, pointing instead to the six exceptions we mention: “Dr. LeMarquand and Witt recognize at least six times that κεφαλή is used for an authority figure in the LXX. That is important because they cannot now argue that Paul, familiar with the LXX, would be utterly unfamiliar with that usage.”

The issue, of course, would not be whether Paul would have been familiar with the six passages, but rather, whether either Paul or his Greek-speaking audience would have understood “authority” to have been a normal meaning of kephalē used as a metaphor given its rare use in the LXX.

What about those six passages?

Given that the writers of the Response claim that six lonely passages out of approximately 180 count for Paul’s use of kephalē to mean “authority” rather than the far more plausible conclusion that only six passages would rather count against such a claim, what do we make of these six passages?

The writers of the Response refer to Deuteronomy 28:13, 44; 2 Samuel 22:44; 1 Kings 21:12; Isaiah 9:13-14; Jeremiah 31:7, and, most significantly Isaiah 7:8-9. They write: “Even a quick perusal of these lends weight to Fitzmyer’s conclusion” that “a Hellenistic Jew could instinctively use κεφαλή as a proper expression for such authority.” Both Payne and Cervin address each of these passages. Does “even a quick perusal” of the six LXX translations point to the conclusion that a Hellenestic Jew would “instinctively” understand kephalē to mean authority when used as a metaphor?

Deuteronomy 28:13, 44 and Isaiah 9:13-14 are three examples of a “head/tail” metaphor. To preserve the metaphorical parallel between “head” and “tail,” any Greek translation would not have made sense unless “head” were translated as kephalē. In addition, the “head/tail” metaphor is not to “leader” and “follower,” but to “above” and “below” (Dt 28:13), “high” and “low” (Dt 28:44), to “great” and “small” (Is. 9:13), to “beginning” and “end” (Is. 19:15).⁷

Cervin notes further that the point of the Deuteronomy passages is about borrowing money, not about ruling. The chapter is about the blessings of material prosperity and the curses of deprivation. If Israel obeys, they will prosper; if they disobey, they will be humiliated.⁸

Payne points out that Isaiah 9:13-14 cannot be referring to “authority” because v. 15 makes clear that “head” refers to the “old man and the flatterers,” while “tail” refers to the lying prophets. The LXX translates “palm branch and reed” in v. 14 as “great and small,” and translates “head” in verse 14 not as kephalē, but as archē.⁹ The “head/tail” metaphor, the translation of the metaphors “palm and branch” and “head” with literal rather than metaphorical equivalents that do not mean “authority” (“great and small,” archē) as well as the actual explanation of the metaphor by the context of the passage (old men and lying prophets) make clear that kephalē does not mean “authority” in this passage.

1 Kings 21:12 must also be excluded because it has nothing to do with authority whatsoever. In order to betray Naboth, Queen Jezebel wrote a letter to have him placed at the “head” of the people. Two men sat opposite him, and falsely accused him of blasphemy. “Head” here has to do with Naboth’s physical location at a table, not his authority, since he had none. The NIV appropriately translates this as “They proclaimed a fast and seated Naboth in a prominent place among the people.”

That leaves 2 Samuel 22:44 and Jeremiah 31:7, two examples of only four LXX passages where Cervin acknowledges that a “connotation of authority is reasonably understood” (also Ps. 17:44 [18:43], Lam. 1:5). However, 2 Sam. 22:44, Ps. 17:44 [18:43], and Lam. 1:5 are examples not of metaphor, but of simile. The passages read not simply kephalē, but eis kephalēn, “as head.” Payne points out that if the passages are similes, then head would be understood literally, and not as a metaphor. Greek readers of the LXX would then either understand these passages as comparisons to a literal head or would interpret “head” with the standard Greek meaning that would fit the context: “top,” “noblest part,” or “source.”¹⁰

There is an ambiguity of translation with Jer. 31:7. A literal translation would read: “Sing aloud with gladness for Jacob, and raise shouts for the head of the nations; proclaim, give praise, and say, ‘O Lord, save your people, the remnant of Israel.’” However, modern versions provide numerous equivalents for rosh, kephalē (“head”): “chief of the nations” (KJV, RSV, ESV, NRSV), “foremost of the nations” (NIV), “leading nation” (CEB), “greatest of nations” (CEV). The point is that the “remnant of Israel,” “Jacob,” is God’s chosen people among all the nations of the earth, that God will gather his exiled people from the nations, and “Jacob” is thus “foremost” or “prominent” among all nations. Nothing in the context suggests that Israel as God’s chosen “remnant” has authority over or is ruling these other nations.

As Cervin summarizes: “[T]he value of the LXX has been overrated as evidence for kephalē connoting ‘leader’ or ‘authority.” The relavitely few uses of kephalē as a metaphor for leader can best be explained as due to Hebrew influence.”¹¹

Given that a less than “quick perusal” shows that five of the passages cited by the Responders do not actually use the metaphor kephalē to mean “authority,” what then of Isaiah 7:8-9, the only one of the six passages actually to be discussed in the Response? The writers follow Joseph Fitzmyer in thinking the passage significant because of a presumed verbal parallel to 1 Cor. 11:3:

“For the head of Syria is Damascus, and the head of Damascus is Rezin. . . . And the head of Ephraim is Samaria, and the head of Samariah is the Son of Remaliah.”

“But I want you to understand that the head of every man is Christ, the head of a wife [sic] is her husband [sic], and the head of Christ is God.”

The first problem with the passage concerns a manuscript discrepancy. The second phrase – “and the head of Damascus is Rezin” – is missing from the LXX translation, and seems to have been introduced by Origen in the third century. The writers of the Response claim that “head” refers to the capital cities, which are “the centers of authority,” but, as Cervin points out, cities are not persons, and, as Payne points out, “cities are not leaders, nor do they have authority.” The “son of Remaliah” does refer to a person who is identified as the “head” of Samariah, and Payne acknowledges Isaiah 7:9b as the single instance in the OT where kephalē would be used as “clearly as a metaphor for ‘leader,’ namely without a proposition best translated ‘as head.’ ” However, Payne also cites several references that refer to the problematic nature of the LXX translation of Isaiah, which is described as showing “obvious signs of incompetence,” having “entire sentences [that] are unintelligible,” and of showing literalistic Hebrew and Aramaic influence in its vocabulary. This would point in the direction of the LXX in this passage as being an overly literal translation from the Hebrew rather than a reflection of ordinary Greek usage.

Could Isaiah 7:8-9 have been the source of Paul’s kephalē metaphor? The difference in categories makes the suggested parallel unlikely. Cities are not persons, and even though the “son of Remalia” was a person, he is described as the “head” not of another person, but of a city. As we pointed out in our essay, Paul’s application of the kephalē metaphor to describe the relationship between a man and a woman is unique, and must be determined by is own context. Paul certainly did not understand the relationship between man and woman to be parallel to the relationship between one city and another or even between a ruler and a city.

The writers of the Response claimed: “Dr. LeMarquand and Witt recognize at least six times that κεφαλή is used for an authority figure in the LXX.” The above should make clear that we did not recognize this at all. Moreover, as we pointed out, even apart from the six controverted passages, the sheer contrast between the use of “head” (rosh) as a metaphor for leader in the Hebrew Old Testament and the failure to use kephalē as a translation for “leader” in the LXX in the vast majority of instances makes clear that Greek thinkers would not have understood the metaphor to mean “authority over.”

Kephalē Outside the LXX

Grudem appeals also to sources outside the Old Testament. In my book Icons of Christ, I had written:

It is significant that in Grudem’s most recent list of fifty examples of “head” meaning authority in ancient literature, all of the examples are from the LXX until he lists Josephus, Philo, and Plutarch (all first or second century). Apart from references to the New Testament, which are controverted, the rest of Grudem’s references are to the second century or later. This means that (apart from the LXX and Philo), Grudem does not provide a single example in ancient Greek literature apart from Paul to which “head” means authority.¹²

Matthew Colvin, a hostile reviewer of my book, responded:

This will not do. If Grudem has Philo and the LXX from before the NT on his side, then he has the main texts of Judaic Greek on his side. It is like saying that “apart from George Washington and John Adams, none of the earliest American presidents were of the Federalist Party.” In addition, Grudem’s citations of Josephus on the same point – citations which Witt dismisses as post-dating the NT – are in fact strong evidence for Judaic Greek usage that is almost precisely contemporaneous with the NT. When confronted with such special pleading, it is hard to avoid the impression that Witt’s real criterion of acceptable lexicography is whether it fits with egalitarian interpretations.

I had included the references to Josephus, Philo, and Plutarch in my book not because I found them convincing, but because in fairness to Grudem, I wanted to acknowledge that he had mentioned them. My failure to discuss them did not mean that my “real criterion of acceptable lexicography is whether it fits with egalitarian interpretations” (Colvin). Rather, I did not find Grudem’s citations at all convincing, and saw no reason to discuss them in a three-sentence summary. Grudem’s mere citation of these passages does not mean that “he has the main texts of Judaic Greek on his side.”

Grudem cites Josephus War 4.261 as “Jerusalem is the ‘head of the whole nation.””

Cervin cites the passage at length in both Greek and English translation:

To such extremes of insanity have they [i.e., gentile criminals] run as not only to transfer their brigands’ exploits from the country and outlying towns to this front [prosōpon] and head [kephalēn] of the whole nation, but actually from the city to the temple.

Cervin notes that “the notion of ‘leader’ may be admitted here,” but also states: “Josephus is simply referring to the city as the ‘head of the nation.’”¹³ It is also significant that Josephus seems to be using “front” and “head” as synonyms, in which case kephalē is a physical metaphor, not a metaphor for authority. If there is a notion of authority, it is passing and not developed in any way. Josephus wrote after Paul was dead, so Paul could not have been influenced by this text, but even if Paul had read this passage, it is difficult to imagine how it could have influenced his own use.

Grudem cites Philo, Moses 2:30: “As the head is the ruling place of the living body, so Ptolemy became among kings.”¹⁴

Cervin emphasizes that Philo was a Neo-Platonist: “One must question whether Philo is using kephalē literally or as a personal metaphor for ‘leader’ or ‘ruler,’ and whether the usage of kephalē has more to do with his Platonic notion of divine reason as the dominant or controlling part of the soul.” Cervin points out that Ptolemey II Philadelphos was “certainly a leader,” but could not have been a ruler because the dynasty had died out. Cervin quotes the entire passage, but the relevant sentence is: “The creditable achievements of this one man almost outnumbered those of all the others put together, and as the head (kephalē) takes the highest place in the living body, so he may be said to head the kings.”

As Cervin notes, those who claim that there is a notion of “authority” in this passage have to explain how one dead king could exercise authority over other dead kings: “There is in fact no notion of authority here; rather this passage illustrates very well the notions of prominence or preeminence . . .” Note as well that Philo is not using a metaphor here but a simile: as the head is literally the highest part of the body, so Ptolemy stands out among other kings.

Grudem cites Philo, On Rewards and Punishment 125: “The virtuous one . . . will be the head of the human race and all the others will be like the parts of the body in and above the head.”

Cervin points out that this is “a simple head-tail metaphor,” which is obvious from the context omitted by Grudem:

Now these things are allegorical, being expressed in a manner of speaking: for just as the head is the first and last part of an animal, and the tail is the last and worst part . . . in the same manner, the virtuous one . . . will be the head of the human race, and all the rest are like the parts of the body, which take their life from the faculties in and above the head.

Cervin writes, “Whether or not ‘head’ is taken to mean ‘source’ in this passage, Philo’s simile is of the animal, and his statement that the head is ‘the first and best part’ makes it clear that ‘preeminence’ is Philo’s point, not authority.”¹⁵

Finally, Grudem cites two passages from Plutarch: Cicero 14.4 and Galba 4.3.

In the first, Cataline speaks of “two bodies,” one having a head and one headless, and asks whether he should “set himself as the head on the latter?” In the second, Vindex suggests that Galba should “make himself the head to a strong body seeking one.”

Cervin points out that Cataline was speaking in Latin, not Greek, so Plutarch is offering a Greek translation of a Latin original. Moreover, there is an almost exactly parallel possible source for Plutarch’s account, written by Cicero himself, also in Latin. In either case, the metaphor is a Latin one, not Greek, and in Latin caput can be used as a metaphor for leader. (But, of course, Paul was not writing in Latin.)

In the second account, Cervin points out that Plutarch is using a simile, not a metaphor. This would also be one of Grudem’s examples in which kephalē operates in a one-to-many military context, which is entirely foreign to Paul’s own use. As I wrote in my book, “Grudem’s examples based on political or military uses of the metaphor of ‘headshp’ are beside the point. Moreover, the political examples on which Grudem draws are always examples of a ‘one to many’ correspondence, of a single person who is ‘head’ over many. Paul certainly does not understand the relationship between men and women to be like that between a single military commander and numerous soldiers or a single ruler and numerous followers.”¹⁶ As this statement was on the very next page of my book, and specifically referred to Grudem’s references, Colvin should have been aware of it, but apparently chose to ignore it.

It should be clear from an actual examination of the texts that Grudem cites from Josephus, Philo, and Plutarch that he does not have “the main texts of Judaic Greek on his side.” Nor are they “strong evidence for Judaic Greek usage.” To the contrary, they are peripheral and of questionable interpretation. There was then no “special pleading” on my part. I cannot speak to whether not mentioning the further qualifications of what I had written concerning Grudem constitutes “special pleading” on the part of a reviewer.

Fitzmyer claimed that, based on his (and Grudem’s) examples, a Hellenistic Jewish writer like Paul could have intended kephalē in 1 Cor. 11:3 to be understood to mean “authority over.” Cervin rightly responded: “This may be so; however, the question remains whether Pau’s native Greek hearers would have understood such a usage. So far, there have been no clear and unambiguous examples of denoting ‘leader’ in extra-biblical literature speaks against such an understanding by native Greeks.”¹⁷

Selective and Misleading Use of Scholarly Sources

I had noted above that although our original essay on Women in Holy Orders contained an extensive bibliography, the writers of the Response showed no indication of familiarity with any of these authors: Ben Witherington, III, Michael J. Gorman, Philip B. Payne, Gordon Fee, Kenneth Bailey, Anthony Thiselton, Craig S. Keener, etc. They appeal to a single essay by Joseph A. Fitzmyer, but more frequently cite Wayne Grudem, the foremost apologist for complementarian theology. They not only rely heavily on Grudem, but even in citing those who disagree with Grudem, they do so selectively, not acknowledging or, rather, completely ignoring, points on which Grudem has been challenged. This results in a misleading impression of the state of the current scholarly discussion.

Our original essay had stated in a parenthesis (quoted in the Response):

Complementarian Wayne Grudem appeals to fifty examples of “head” meaning “authority” in ancient culture, but apart from the handful of LXX examples and the apostle Paul’s, which are the point of disagreement, all of his examples occur after Paul, and are military or political examples of “one to many” leadership.

Our footnote referred to two appendices in Grudem’s most recent (and longest) work, Evangelical Feminism and Biblical Truth, published in 2005, so it should have been clear that this was the work to which we were referring. The writers of the Response claim that “it is inaccurate to suggest that Grudem’s examples are exclusively from sources subsequent to Paul,” stating that Grudem “identifies a great number of passages from writers who both precede and succeed Paul,” and he also includes “four passages written by Philo” and “six by Plutarch” (64).

However, the Response refers not to Grudem’s book that we had cited, but to an essay written by Grudem as long ago as 1985.¹⁸ The Response does not reference our original citation, but only Grudem’s essay, giving the impression that we had misrepresented Grudem. So our statement was not “inaccurate.” We clearly intended to refer to Grudem’s most recent work, not to something he had written over thirty years ago.

This misleading citation of our text is typical of how the Response selectively interacts with and summarizes other authors critical of Grudem’s position. Cervin responded in 1989 to Grudem’s essay with “Does Кεφαλή Mean ‘Source’ or ‘Authority Over’ in Greek Literature? A Rebuttal,” cited above. At the conclusion of this essay, Cervin states: “The bulk of Grudem’s examples of κεφαλή meaning ‘authority over’ or ‘leader’ have proved to be non-examples.” Cervin states that only four of 37 examples are “clear and unambiguous,” “twelve examples are false,” seven are “illegitimate,” two “do not exist,” and one “cannot be decided.”¹⁹ Cervin’s essay is a devastating critique of Grudem’s 1985 essay. The writers of the Response cite an essay written by Grudem in response to Cervin in 1990, so they should have been aware of Cervin’s original essay. They ignored it.²⁰ They also cite Cervin’s more recent 2016 essay, in which Cervin goes into great detail to once again challenge Grudem’s readings, including the references to Philo and Plutarch, as noted above. The authors of the Response do not respond to Cervin’s criticisms of Grudem because they do not even acknowledge them.

The authors do misleadingly cite Cervin, however, when they think it will help their case. In his 1989 essay, Cervin had stated that a possible meaning of the metaphor “head” might be “preeminent,” a point to which he returns in the 2016 essay. The Response cites the 2016 essay (note 130, p. 65), but then cites Grudem’s response to Cervin in 1990 to claim that “even if all of Cervin’s criticisms of my article were valid, his article would still be a rejection of the egalitarian claim that κφαλή means ‘source’ in the NT . . . In his final explanation of the meaning of ‘preeminent’ with reference to ‘the male-dominant culture of which Paul was a part were correct, his article would have to be seen as a modification of my position, not a rejection of it” (66).

Yet in the 2016 Cervin essay cited by the Response, Cervin wrote concerning Eph. 4:15-6, that “[t]he connotation of ‘source’ may be implied,” and of Col. 2:18-19, “the notion of source or life may be an implication derived solely from the context.”²¹ Concerning the notion of preeminence, Cervin wrote: “Grudem states that the notion of ‘authority over’ is primary with respect to the meaning of kephalē, and that the notions of preeminence, if they are valid at all, are mere ‘overtures’ of that metaphor,” and that preeminence “without any nuance of leadership” is mistaken. Cervin responds: “However, I suggest that the opposite is the case. . . . Contrary to Grudem, it is not the case that the notions of prominence and authority are intrinsically linked together. Things, as well as people, may have prominence without authority . . . Also, authority may exist without prominence. . . The same is true of the metaphorical use of the Greek word kephalē; authority is not a necessary entailment of the metaphor, but I would suggest that prominence is” (Cervin, 10).

So Cervin is in stark disagreement with Grudem in both of his essays. The writers of the Response not only fail to acknowledge Cervin’s criticisms, but misleading cite him to suggest that his notion of the metaphor of kephalē to mean “prominence” provides support to Grudem’s position. It rather opposes it.

A second misleading reference to a position that is actually critical of the complementarian position concerns Alan Johnson’s essay “A Review of the Scholarly Debate on the Meaning of ‘Head’ (κεφαλή) in Paul’s Writings.”²² The writers attempt to correct our statement that “NT scholars argue that ‘head’ in 1 Corinthians means ‘source,’ or ‘preeminent’ or ‘honored source’” by citing Johnson’s essay, stating “But scholars also argue that head in 1 Corinthians 11 refers to one in authority” (67). They refer to Johnson’s essay as a “good summary of the differing positions.” They seem to endorse Johnson’s position that kephalē in 1 Corinthians 11:3 refers to the husband (sic) as “prominent” or “honorable” to the wife “in terms of the patriarchal structure of Paul’s day.” They omit Johnson’s conclusion, however, that Paul redefines this “honored” position in terms of “love and self-giving,” and that “in our non-patriarchal culture (one not requiring male honor), mutual yielding (v. 21) and mutual respect in my judgment best fulfills this model of Christ.” More importantly, the Response writers seem unaware of Johnson’s commentary on 1 Corinthians in which he suggests that Paul’s goal is to challenge the surrounding patriarchal culture. In his commentary, Johnson argues that “head” does not mean “authority over,” there is “no reference to submission,” and “no strict hierarchy.” The term “head” refers to an “honored order of pairs.” “Authority over” (v. 10) refers to the woman’s own authority, and Paul actually inverts “the hierarchical relationship between the sexes,” breaking out of patriarchal gender roles. Johnson claims that “honored source” is the best reading of kephalē.²³ So again, the writers of the Response misleadingly summarize the views of someone who actually disagrees with their position as if he were supporting it.

After their misleading citation of Johnson, the authors of the Response claim: “Those who argue that ‘head’ means source or origin exclusively and deny that it carries any notion of authority now seem to be in the distinct minority.” This is a caricature. No one suggests that “head” means “source or origin exclusively.” To the contrary, however, as the essays by Cervin and Johnson, the essays and book by Payne, and the numerous references we cite in our bibliography, make clear, the complementarian position that “head” means “authority over” in Paul seems rather to be the minority, even a vanishing position, in recent scholarship. Payne writes, “The majority view in recent scholarship has shifted to understand ‘head’ (κεφαλή) in this passage to mean ‘source’ rather than ‘authority’ . . .”²⁴

The writers of the Response misleadingly cite two other egalitarian authors as well. On page 38, they cite Richard Bauckham to make the claim that the apostolic office is distinct to the twelve in order to challenge the significance of our claim that women associated with Jesus engaged in “apostolic” work. On the very next page, we refer to Andronicus and Junia (a woman), whom Paul designates as “outstanding among the apostles.” The authors question this designation, claiming that while Junia may have done “apostolic work,” she was not an apostle in the sense of “one of the twelve.” I discuss Junia at length in a chapter in my book, where I also distinguish between the role of the twelve and other apostles. I do not claim that Junia was one of the twelve apostles! What the writers of the Response do not acknowledge is that the very same Richard Bauckham whom they cite against any notion of women apostles, wrote a book cited in our bibliography, in which he argues that Junia held the office of apostle, and was not merely someone who, as they put it, merely did “missionary work.”²⁵

In their discussion of 1 Corinthians 14:33b-36, the authors appeal to Anthony Thiselton’s commentary on 1 Corinthians to argue that the “most satisfying” view of the passage is that it “prohibits women specifically from participating in the (authoritative) judging or evaluation of prophetic utterances” (p. 76). I cite Thiselton’s position in my book (p. 153), acknowledging it as one among several possible interpretations of Paul’s prohibition. What the Response fails to acknowledge, again, is that Thiselton is not a complementarian. He understands Paul not to be prohibiting women engaging in authoritative teaching or public speaking in church, but only in disorderly behavior that disrupts the worship service. The authors again cite an authority who actually disagrees with their position to give the misleading impression that he supports it!

It should be clear from the above that the authors of the Response make two fundamental errors. First, they not only assume that Paul’s use of the metaphor of kephalē derives from sources outside his own writing (either the LXX or pagan sources), but their appeal to these sources is itself highly misleading. To quote that great biblical exegete Inigo Montoya: “You Keep Using That Word, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means.”

Second, they rely exclusively on a handful of complementarian exegetes to make their argument. They seem largely unaware of challenges raised by other biblical scholars. To the extent that they cite authors who are not complementarian, they cite them selectively and misleadingly, giving the misleading position that these authors support their position when they actually challenge it.

I will address questions of exegesis and hermeneutics concerning Paul’s use of kephalē (“head”) used as a metaphor and exousia (“authority”) in Ephesians 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 in separate essays.